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Objective:  To  improve  previous  approaches  to  health  system  goals  valuation.
Methods:  We  reviewed  literature  on  health  system  performance  and  previous  comparative
performance  assessments,  and  combined  this  with  literature  on  process  utility  to  create  a
theoretical  foundation  for health  system  goals.  We  used  a discrete  choice  experiment  to
elicit  goal  weights.  To  obtain  social  justice  weights  respondents  were  placed  behind  a  ‘veil
of ignorance’.  To ensure  that  respondents  understood  their  task,  we instructed  them  in  a
classroom  setting.
Results: We  identiﬁed  ﬁve health  system  goals.  All  ﬁve  goals  signiﬁcantly  affected  choice
behavior. An equitable  distribution  of  health  obtained  the  highest  weight  (0.34),  followed
by average  level  of health  (0.29)  and ﬁnancial  fairness  (0.24).  Both  process  outcomes  (utility
derived  from  the  process  and  its  distribution)  received  much  lower  weights  (0.07  and  0.06,
respectively).
Conclusions:  Our  framework  adds  to that  of  the  World  Health  Organization.  We  demon-
strated the  feasibility  of  measuring  societal  valuation  of health  system  goals  with  a
multi-attribute  technique  based  on  trade-offs.  Our  weights  placed  much  greater  emphasis
on health  and  health  inequality  than  on process  outcomes.  Our  study  improves  the  method-
nal  hea
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hors. Pology of  internatio
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. Introduction
Health systems around the world have contributed to
etter health and life expectancy with varying degrees of
uccess. Even in countries with seemingly similar resources
utcomes vary markedly [1]. To date, policy effects on
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the performance of health systems remain largely unclear.
Monitoring and evaluating performance can generate this
vital policy information. Moreover, cross-country compar-
isons enable countries to learning from others.
The challenge, however, is how to assess health systems
that are extremely complex and have multi-dimensional
goals. This complex task has been explored by the World
Health Organization (WHO) and the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Our aim is to improve the valuation of health sys-
tem goals. To do so, we ﬁrst unify literature on health
system goals, equity, and process utility to create the
underpinnings of a theoretical framework for health sys-
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.tem evaluation. Second, we review previous approaches
to deriving relative weights for health system goals. Third,
we  suggest an enhanced methodology based on a multi-
attribute choice technique to elicit goal valuations using a
r CC BY-NC-ND license.
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its distribution are reasonably comparable to WHO’s levelM. Franken, X. Koolman /
‘veil of ignorance’ perspective. Last, we present goal valua-
tions for the Netherlands based on our proposed method.
2. Theoretical framework for health system goals
Until the 1990s health economics was dominated by
the assumption that ‘health’ was the dominant outcome of
health systems. This links with the consequentialism moral
theory, which focuses solely on outcomes irrespective of
the process that led to them, and Jeremy Bentham’s ‘act
utilitarianism’, which states that the greatest amount of
happiness for the greatest number of people determines
choice behavior. Although utility derived from health is an
obvious outcome of a health system, research showed that
people also care about the processes that precede health
outcomes, irrespective whether they affect health [2–4].
Therefore, processes are not just means to an end, not just
instrumental to an intrinsic goal, but are an intrinsic goal
of the health system.
This utility derived from processes, procedural utility,
has a base in social sciences. Parsons’ social action the-
ory (1937) already described the necessity of the subjective
dimension of human action [5]. Psychologists have devel-
oped a comprehensive notion of basic psychological needs
for the human self, evident in the “self-determination
theory of intrinsic motivation” by Deci and Ryan [6,7].
The theory maintains that human motivation originates
from three innate needs: autonomy, competence, and
relatedness; individual well-being therefore depends on
procedures that address them [6,7].
The theory of procedural utility can be directly applied
to health care. Consequently, both health outcomes and the
process attributes of non-health outcomes are health sys-
tem goals. Furthermore, it is widely recognized that health
systems’ costs should be related to capacity to pay rather
than the risk of illness [8]. Therefore, health systems have
three independent outcome-oriented objectives: health
utility, process utility, and ﬁnancial fairness.
2.1. Health utility
Health systems aim to improve health and strive for
the highest possible health status of the entire population,
taking both morbidity and mortality into account. Behind
a ‘veil of ignorance’ the distribution of health also mat-
ters; empirical evidence indicates that the public is willing
to trade efﬁciency for social objectives such as equity
[9–11]. Therefore, health utility consists of two goals:
average level of health and the equitable distribution of
health.
2.2. Process utility
Procedural utility can arise from two sources [12]. First,
interaction between people can generate utility since
people evaluate actions by how they are treated by others.
Second, people have preferences for good institutions in
addition to health outcomes (e.g. preferences on allocative
and redistributive decisions) that address the innate needs
of human motivation (autonomy, competence, and related-
ness). Institutions also establish the fundamental rules forPolicy 112 (2013) 28– 34 29
societal decision making. As a result, process attributes of
health systems are twofold: utility derived from interaction
between people and the health system (“how people are
treated by the health system”), and utility obtained from
living under institutions (“how allocative and redistribu-
tive decisions are taken”). Although distributional fairness
of process utility is not well founded in moral theory, we
followed the WHO  framework and therefore included both
process utility and its distribution in our framework.
2.3. Financial fairness
Murray et al. [13] claim that a health system is fairly
ﬁnanced “if the ratio of total health system contribution
of each household through all payment mechanisms to
that household’s capacity to pay is identical for all house-
holds, independent of the household’s health status or use
of health system.” This signiﬁes two key challenges. First,
households should not pay an excessive share of their
income for health care or become impoverished [14]. Sec-
ond, wealthy households should contribute more than poor
households reﬂecting vertical equity and an element of
progressivity.
3. Existing international frameworks
Several countries, such as the USA, United Kingdom,
the Netherlands, Australia, and Canada, have designed and
implemented national schemes and indicators to measure
health system performance [15]. Cross-country compar-
ison, however, requires a comprehensive international
framework such as those of the OECD and WHO.
OECD framework.  The three main goals of the OECD
framework are (i) health improvement and outcomes,
(ii) responsiveness and access, and (iii) ﬁnancial contri-
bution and health expenditure [16]. Without suggesting
any relative importance of the system goals it provides a
framework to measure performance in several dimensions
that seem to be based on the historical development of
health systems. A composite score requires, however, each
goal to be independent. The OECD framework consists of
input and output variables, and intermediate as well as
end goals. Consequently, using the OECD framework gives
rise to methodological problems when weighing goals.
WHO  framework.  The WHO  framework for performance
measurement consists of three intrinsic goals of health
systems: health, responsiveness, and fairness in ﬁnancing
[1]. The ﬁrst two are assessed on both level and fairness of
the distribution. The framework satisﬁes the required con-
ditions (i.e., a complete set of intrinsic goals) to facilitate
global performance assessment.
WHO’s health system goals closely resemble those iden-
tiﬁed for our own  theoretical framework. Health utility andand the distribution of health. Our two  sources of process
utility can be described by WHO’s assessment of quality
and equity of responsiveness. Last, one could suggest that
ﬁnancial fairness reﬂects WHO’s fairness in ﬁnancing.
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. Valuing health system goals
.1. Previous approach
WHO’s goal weights were acquired by measuring pre-
erences of individuals with health system knowledge via
n internet-based questionnaire, which included inter-
ctive, weight-assigning pie charts, descriptive multiple
hoice questions, and ranking tasks. The ﬁnal weights were
ounded to the nearest one-eighth for the World Health
eport 2000 (WHR) to make the composite goal easier to
nderstand [17]. In 2000 and 2001, the WHO  performed
 follow up multi-country study to measure preferences
rom the public [18]. These questionnaires consisted of
anking tasks and pie charts. The Dutch sample included
566 respondents: 1068 face-to-face and 498 postal inter-
iews [18].
.2. Critiques on the WHO  approach
Much critical attention and debate followed the publi-
ation of the WHO  results. One of the major concerns was
hat WHO’s relative weights were highly subjective since
hey were derived from respondents who were far from
epresentative [19–21]. The WHO  justiﬁed its method by
tating: “the purpose of the ﬁrst survey was not to describe
references in a population, but rather empirically derive
 set of weights reﬂecting normative choices” [22].
Richardson et al. [23] maintained that effective weights
epend on variation in scores across countries as well as
he nominal weights. Consequently, if there is no differ-
nce in, for example, health inequality then, regardless of
he weight of 0.25, it would contribute nothing to the rank-
ng scores. However, applying a standard set of weights
ppears to deny differences between countries’ ideologies
nd theories of social justice.
Moreover, the Oswaldo Cruz Foundation [24] concluded
hat the composite index is very sensitive to modiﬁcation
n the relative weights and claimed that some countries can
hift the scale by more than thirty points by small weight
djustments. On the contrary, Lauer et al. [25] concluded
hat even large changes would have a small impact and
hat all rankings remained within the uncertainty intervals.
evertheless, Lauer et al. [26], in yet another publication,
rgued that the differences could be large for individual
ountries because of the impact of publication of the rank-
ngs.
The most essential critiques concern the valuation
ethodology. Smith [21] argued that WHO’s methodology
as highly questionable and that it is unlikely that it would
licit the required relative marginal valuation of an extra
nit of performance. Moreover, Williams [20] claimed that
he main issue was the use of rankings, scores, and rating
cales rather than facing respondents directly with trade-
ffs.
Making trade-offs is at the heart of economics. In a
ulti-attribute environment, such as a health system, indi-
iduals choose between attributes based on their relative
mportance. The WHO  limited their survey by using pie-
harts, rankings, and descriptive multiple choice questions;
heir instrument did not allow for deliberation.olicy 112 (2013) 28– 34
4.3. Enhanced methodology
The Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) provides
a foundation for valuing complex and multi-dimensional
objectives. It has its roots in classical measurement the-
ory and theories of economic choice behavior. In the
last decade, multi-attribute valuation methods and espe-
cially discrete choice experiments (DCEs) have become
increasingly popular. DCE draws upon Lancaster’s eco-
nomic theory of value [27] and is ﬁrmly rooted in the
random utility theory [28].
Furthermore, Dolan et al. [29] distinguish respondents’
perspectives in two  dimensions: who the respondent
should have in mind and at what point in time. The former
dimension concerns oneself, other people, or all people;
that is, preferences are personal, social, or socially inclusive,
respectively. The time dimension relates to the context in
which the valuation is obtained, that is, whether it is ex
ante or ex post. The structure of a health system depends in
large part on society’s choices concerning resource alloca-
tion; relatedly, a person’s societal position often reﬂects
a feeling of social (un)fairness. Therefore, it is essential
to elicit ex ante socially inclusive personal preferences for
social justice valuations. Valuations should therefore be
obtained in a procedurally fair way reﬂecting a social jus-
tice perspective; i.e., respondents assume a Rawlsian “veil
of ignorance”. The main characteristic of Rawls’s approach
is that people make choices without knowing where their
own  position might be in a society [30]. The “veil of igno-
rance” ensures that the principles of justice are blind to age,
health status or societal position.
An enhanced methodology should therefore be based
on a multi-attribute choice technique such as a DCE. This
technique applies direct trade-off questions, improves con-
scientious deliberation, and elicits marginal valuations. To
ensure social justice valuations, goal valuations should be
obtained using an ex ante perspective.
5. Methods
We  conducted a DCE to obtain goal valuations in the
Netherlands. Our ﬁve-step procedure, typical of a DCE, was
to: (1) identify and describe the attributes for health sys-
tems; (2) assign attribute levels based on goal variation; (3)
combine attribute levels and create hypothetical scenarios;
(4) establish goal valuations; and (5) analyze and interpret
the data.
5.1. Attributes and levels
Our health system goals satisfy the attribute criteria
by being complete, operational, decomposable, non-
redundant and minimum-sized [31]. For use in a
questionnaire, attributes must be meaningful, relevant and
easy to understand, and their levels should be plausi-
ble, actionable and tradable [32]. Variation in their levels
should mimic  existing variation.We pilot-tested attribute and level descriptions in 54
participants [data not shown]. They were interviewed
face-to-face or by telephone and were asked to ﬁll out a
questionnaire while thinking aloud. Pilot questionnaires
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Table  1
Attributes and descriptions of attributes and levels used in the DCE exercise.
Attribute Attribute description Level description
Average level of health Average health adjusted life expectancy 74, 72, 70 and 68 years
Distribution of health Differences in health adjusted life expectancy
across social groups
3, 5, 7 and 9 years difference
Average level of process outcome Patient experiences very good experiences, good experiences,
rather good experiences, reasonable
experiences
Distribution of process outcome Differences in experiences between patients no difference, small difference, some
 of heal
across social groups
Financial fairness Persons in poverty because
payments
offered 30 questions comprising paired comparison of two
attributes in which vignettes varied by one level. The
interviewer could ask about the basis for respondents’
trade-offs and the extent to which they understood the
descriptions. Answers provided insight into respondents’
ways of thinking and revealed any misinterpretation or
misunderstanding of the notions of the attributes. Respon-
dents initially found it difﬁcult to make a clear distinction
between the intrinsic and instrumental contributions of
process factors. The pilots also showed that respondents
changed their behavior when choosing from behind a veil
of ignorance, some explicitly mentioning that equity was
more of a concern. Preferences concerning solidarity versus
individualism were partly balanced out. Table 1 shows the
attributes and the ﬁnal descriptions of the attributes and
levels which were used in the DCE exercise.
Health outcome. Utility obtained from health outcome
reﬂects the average level of health in a population
expressed by life expectancy that takes both morbidity
and mortality into account. The levels are actual Health-
Adjusted Life Expectancy (HALE) years in the Netherlands:
74, 72, 70 and 68 years.
Distribution of health outcome. We  assessed existing
inequalities in HALE in the Netherlands. Inequality is
present across social classes, educations groups, income
levels, ethnic groups, gender and geographic areas. The
differences across social groups in HALE were 3, 5, 7 and
9 years.
Process outcome from interactions. Because the pilots
revealed that respondents experienced difﬁculties in
understanding the process-outcome concept, the concept
and its implications were clariﬁed and illustrated with
recognizable examples from the Dutch health system dur-
ing the DCE exercise. The levels in experience were very
good, good, rather good, and reasonable. This variation
mimics the actual variation in patient experiences in the
Netherlands as measured by a population based study of
the WHO  (average responsiveness score of 85.7 on a scale
of 0 to 100) [33].
Distribution of process outcome. Although distributional
fairness of process utility is not well founded in moral the-
ory, we followed the WHO  framework and allowed our
empirical test to indicate the value respondents attached
to an unequal distribution of process utility. This attribute
thus indicates the inequality in the distribution of process
outcome across groups. In the Netherlands options exist todifference and fair difference
th system 0, 1, 2 and 3 person(s) per 200 persons
bypass waiting lists and “buy” quality but the majority of
the population sees this as inequitable. The Health Insur-
ance Act has since 2006 been moving toward managed
competition in health care and it is thus likely that more
options will become available to buy additional insurance
or pay out-of-pocket for extra quality and other process
attributes in the future. Therefore, our levels are actual dif-
ferences in distribution and partly reﬂect potential future
developments. The levels of difference offered were none,
small, some, and fair. The differences in the levels were
clariﬁed and illustrated with recognizable examples from
the Dutch health system.
Financial fairness.  The last attribute describes ﬁnancial
protection against costs of illness. We  explored national
health insurance premiums and potential co-payments,
and connected these ﬁnancial ﬂows with catastrophic
payment and impoverishment. We  selected a quasi-
relative poverty measure found to be recognizable and
accurate for the core perception of poverty within the
Dutch population [34]. We  expressed the levels as con-
sequences of variations in (co-) payments. The levels
offered were 0, 1, 2 and 3 extra person(s) per 200 per-
sons unable to satisfy basic needs because of health system
payments.
5.2. Experimental design
A full factorial design would generate 1024 (45) sce-
narios. To reduce the DCE exercise to a manageable level,
we applied a fractional factorial design. We  obtained an
orthogonal array from the online Sloan library in order
to assign 16 choice sets (http://www.research.att.com/
∼njas/oadir). We  applied an optimal design generator
(12332, 21123 and 33211) based on strategies described
by Street et al. [35]. Such a fold-over strategy provides
an optimal design with a high efﬁciency for estimating
main effects while satisfying the statistical properties of
level balance, orthogonality, minimal overlap, and utility
balance [32]. Main effects usually account for 70–90% of
explained variance [28]. The order of vignettes was ran-
domly varied for all three choice sets.
We did not include an opt-out option because (i) it can
generate problems such as applying heuristics to prevent
making difﬁcult choices or preferring a status quo and (ii) it
is impossible to opt-out by choosing not to have any health
system. Our respondents were choosing from behind a veil
of ignorance and thus we  assumed that there was no default
system, i.e., an opt-out option was non-existent.
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Table  2
Results conditional logit model.
Attribute Coefﬁcient Std. error z value P > |z| 95% Conf. interval
Average level of health −1.097 0.067 −16.31 0.000 −1.229 −0.966
Distribution of health −1.294 0.073 −17.84 0.000 −1.436 −1.152
Average level of process outcome −0.277 0.058 −4.73 0.000 −0.391 −0.162
Distribution of process outcome −0.236 0.061 −3.84 0.000 −0.356 −0.116
Financial fairness −0.927 0.063 −14.64 0.000 −1.051 −0.803
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Chi-Square test 948.75
Pseudo R2 0.350
.3. Data collection
We  selected 63 persons familiar with health systems to
nsure that respondents understood their task. Moreover,
espondents were instructed by the principal investigator
n a classroom setting via a PowerPoint presentation and
 20-minute interactive discussion about the meaning of
he attributes and their levels. In particular, the distinc-
ion between the intrinsic and instrumental contribution
f both process attributes was explained and the levels
ere made operational by illustrative examples from the
utch health system. Each respondent was provided with
he information on paper to refer to if needed. Respondents
ad to choose in which country they would prefer to be
orn.
.4. Data analysis
The software program STATA was used to perform
ata analysis. Given the exploratory character and aim
f our study to investigate the feasibility to estimate
ealth system goal valuations using a multi-attribute tech-
ique based on trade-off questions, we used a conditional
ogit model to estimate the coefﬁcients. The estimated
unction for the valuations of health system goals was: Yla-
ent = 0 + 1* average level of health + 2* distribution of
ealth + 3* process outcome + 4* distribution of process
utcome + 5* ﬁnancial fairness + .
. Results
.1. Econometric model
All responses were included in our data analysis since
ll respondents correctly answered the dominant question.
able 2 presents the results of the conditional logit model,
hich provides good insight into respondents’ trade-off
ehavior because the outcome probabilities are based only
n the attributes and their levels. The summary statistics
how that the model had a decent ﬁt with a pseudo R2 of
.35 and a statistically-signiﬁcant Chi-square test of 948.75.
The coefﬁcients reﬂect the relative importance of the
ystem goals. As expected, they revealed that respondents
avor the best attainment in all ﬁve goals. The associated
-values indicated that all attributes have a statistically
igniﬁcant effect on choice behavior. The table shows that
ealth distribution received the highest importance fol-
owed by average level of health, ﬁnancial fairness, averagelevel of process outcome, and distribution of process out-
come, respectively.
6.2. Marginal rate of substitution
The Marginal Rate of Substitution (MRS) is computed
by dividing the coefﬁcients and demonstrates the trade-off
between attributes. Table 3 shows that individuals are will-
ing to give up 0.848 level in health distribution to gain one
level in average health (1/2), meaning that individuals
will trade 2 years of average health for 1.70 years of health
inequality.
6.3. Valuation as percentage
To enable direct comparison between WHO’s relative
weights and our valuations, our coefﬁcients needed to be
converted into percentages by dividing the coefﬁcient of
one attribute by the sum of all coefﬁcients. This method
is based on the same assumption as the MRS  calculation,
that is, linearity of the coefﬁcients and a comparable real-
istic amount of variation between the levels for each of the
attributes. Table 4 shows the results.
Although the sum of the quality (0.36 versus 0.37)
and equity (0.64 versus 0.63) objectives are similar, their
weights are derived differently. Speciﬁcally, our valuations
place much greater emphasis on health (0.63 versus 0.49)
and far less on process outcomes (0.13 versus 0.29). Fur-
thermore, our results show a greater weight for health
distribution (0.34) compared to the average level of health
(0.29), whereas these weights were almost similar in
WHO’s survey (0.25 and 0.24, respectively). Fairness in
ﬁnancing is roughly equally weighted in both methodolo-
gies.
7. Discussion
The focus of our research was twofold. First, we  identi-
ﬁed ﬁve health system goals and explored their theoretical
foundation. We  included the process of health care deliv-
ery in a utility framework supporting that the process
of care giving is an end goal of health systems, irrespec-
tively whether it affects health, and thus can be traded-off
against health outcomes. Second, we obtained valuations
for the goals using a multi-attribute technique based on
trade-offs. We  used actual variation in goal attainment,
elicited marginal weights from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’
reﬂecting the original position, and created a setting to
help respondents understand the concepts and their task.
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Table  3
Marginal rate of substitution.
Coefﬁcients Attribute/Attribute Observed MRS
1/2 average level of health/distribution of health 0.848
1/3 average level of health/average level of process outcome 3.968
1/4 average level of health/distribution of process outcome 4.651
1/5 average level of health/ﬁnancial fairness 1.184
2/3 distribution of health/average level of process outcome 4.677
2/4 distribution of health/distribution of process outcome 5.482
2/5 distribution of health/ﬁnancial fairness 1.396
3/4 average level of process outcome/distribution of process outcome 1.172
3/5 average level of process outcome/ﬁnancial fairness 0.298
4/5 distribution of process outcome/ﬁnancial fairness 0.255
Table 4
Goal valuations as percentages from different sources.
WHO  1st surveya WHR  applied weightsa WHO  2nd survey (Netherlands)
(face-to-face/postal)b
Discrete choice
experiment valuations
Average level of health (1) 0.24 0.25 0.29
Distribution of health (2) 0.25 0.25 0.34
Average level of process outcome (3) 0.13 0.125 0.07
Distribution of process outcome (4) 0.16 0.125 0.06
Financial fairness (5) 0.22 0.25 0.24
Health  outcomes (1 + 2) 0.49 0.5 0.415 0.63
Process outcomes (3 + 4) 0.29 0.25 0.309/0.306 0.13
Financial fairness (5) 0.22 0.25 0.277/0.279 0.24
Quality (1 + 3) 0.37 0.375 0.376/0.432 0.36
Equity  (2 + 4 + 5) 0.63 0.625 
a Gakidou et al., 2000 [22].
b Gakidou et al., 2003 [18].
Consequently, we tested all ﬁve goals statistically signiﬁ-
cantly affect choice behavior independently. An equitable
health distribution has the highest valuation, followed
by average level of health and ﬁnancial fairness. Both
attributes measuring process utility receive much lower
weights.
By assuming a linear additive model for a latent prefer-
ence variable, it was possible to compare our valuations
with WHO’s weights. Some might argue that our DCE
valuations only provide a rough estimate of actual per-
centages. Nevertheless, our results are quite different from
WHO’s weights. Speciﬁcally, much weight of both pro-
cess attributes shifts toward both health attributes. The
shift may  be due to the fact that we speciﬁcally made
respondents aware that the intrinsic contribution of pro-
cess attributes do not directly inﬂuence health. The extent
to which WHO’s respondents were conscious of this dis-
tinction is unknown.
Several researchers have claimed that people are willing
to sacriﬁce overall health to achieve a more equitable distri-
bution of health [9,11,26,36]. Our results show this greater
weight for health inequality whereas WHO’s weights are
equal for both health attributes. First, an equitable health
distribution attains a higher valuation compared to aver-
age level of health. Second, the computed MRS  suggests
that individuals are willing to trade 2 years of average
health for 1.7 years in health inequality. We  believe that
this might be attributable to our enhanced methodology to
derive marginal valuations from behind a veil of ignorance.The complexity of the attributes and levels forced us
to make a trade-off between potential interviewer bias
caused by an interactive classroom setting and task sim-
plicity. Furthermore, our respondents were well-educated0.624/0.569 0.64
and familiar with the Dutch health system. It is possible that
we introduced selection bias and the goal valuations are not
representative of the preferences of the Dutch population.
Gakidou et al. [18], however, conclude that WHO’s valua-
tions varied only slightly between informed respondents
and the population at large. We  also obtained goal valua-
tions from behind a veil of ignorance, although whether
such a scheme guarantees societal preferences that are
genuinely impartial is debatable. Two  ﬁndings in favor of
impartiality was  that respondents’ equity concerns were
altered by the ‘original position’ due to ‘the veil of igno-
rance’ and choice behavior in the pilot study changed when
respondents assumed an unknown position in society.
At the methodological level, economists are inclined to
consider DCEs superior to ranking and rating since they are
based on the random utility theory. Therefore, we argue
that the research resulting from our enhanced methodol-
ogy can be seen as a follow-up to the WHO  surveys. We
do, however, acknowledge methodological issues of DCEs,
most of which are related to human cognitive processes.
For example, choice experiments assume that people have
stable preferences and are willing to trade between all
attributes and a ‘veil of experience’ can inﬂuence decision
making through status quo bias and the endowment effect
[37]. However, these issues have received much attention
within health economics and should not be seen as ‘threats’
to economic methods of valuation [38].
8. ConclusionsOur study demonstrates the feasibility of measuring
health system goal valuations using a multi-attribute tech-
nique based on direct trade-off questions. We  believe
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ecause we applied a comprehensive enhanced method-
logy, used actual variation in goal attainment, elicited
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international) comparisons of health system performance.
ur study provides a promising and challenging basis on
hich to improve the methodology of global health system
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n turn enhances global evidence-based health policy infor-
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